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UNION SECURITY AND RIGHT-TO-WORK
LAWS: IS CO-EXISTENCE POSSIBLE?
J. T.

CUTLER

THE UNION STRUGGLE
At the beginning of the 20th Century management was
all powerful and with the decision in Adair v. United States1
it seemed as though Congress was helpless to regulate labor
relations. The Supreme Court had held that the power to
regulate commerce could not be applied to the labor field
because of the conflict with fundamental rights secured by
the Fifth Amendment. Moreover, an employer could require
a person to agree not to join a union as a condition of his
employment and any legislative interference with such an
agreement would be an arbitrary and unjustifiable infringement
of the liberty of contract.
It was not until the first World War that the federal
government successfully entered the field of industrial relations with the creation by President Wilson of the War Labor
Board. Upon being organized the Board adopted a policy forbidding employer interference with the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively and employer discrimination
against employees engaging in lawful union activities2 .
The next stage of federal entry into the struggle between
union and management came with the enactment of the Railway
Labor Act of 1926' which provided for collective bargaining
and allowed an injunction against a railroad that interferes
with its employees' right of self-organization. A change in
judicial thinking concerning the propriety of government action
in the labor field was evidenced by a Supreme Court which
1208 U.S. 161 (1908).
2 Note, 5 Law & Contemp. Prob. 175, 177 (1938).
3 44 Smt. 577 (1926).

upheld the Act declaring: "We entertain no doubt of the
constitutional authority of Congress to enact the prohibition4 ."
The tide began to run strongly in favor of the unions with
the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Act5 in 1932 which provided that contracts in which employees agreed not to join a
labor union could not be enforced in the federal courts. This
act was also commonly known as the anti-injunction act since
its key provision prohibited a federal court from issuing an injunction in a case involving or growing out of a labor dispute.
The growing political power of labor meshed with the
era of the New Deal and the unemployment problems of the
depression-ridden thirties brought about the enactment of the
National Labor Relations Act' or the Wagner Act in 1935.
This legislation was a tremendous boost for the unions, providing security in the form of the closed shop and the union shop'
and setting out the unfair labor practices of management. The
Act was promptly challenged and declared unconstitutional in
several lower courts, setting the stage for the crucial test in
the classic case of National Labor Relations Board v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corporation'. By the same slim majority of five
to four which arose during the dramatic days of the court
packing plan to reverse the constitutional doctrines blocking
the New Deal program, the Supreme Court upheld the Na4 Texas

and New Orleans Railroad Company v. Brotherhood of Railway

and Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570 (1930).
5 47 Star. 70 (1932).
0

49 Stat. 449 (1935).

7 A union shop isone in which the employee may be hired without first

joining the union, but it requires him to join and continue his membership in the union after he is hired. The closed shop is one in which
the employee must join the union prior to becoming employed. Section
8(a) (3) of the Labor-Management Relations Act makes it mandatory
for the employee to join the union within thirty days should the union
have a security contract with the employer incorporating the union shop
agreement. The closed shop is unlawful under the Labor-Management
Relations Act. See also, S.Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1935)
and Stone, Trade Unionism In A Free Enterprise Society, 14 U.Chi.L.Rev. 339, 403 (1947).
8301 U.S. 1 (1937), 25 Calif. L.Rev. 593 (1937), 32 IlL. L.Rev. 196
(1937), 23 Va. L.Rev. 946 (1938).

tional Labor Relations Act. Speaking out for the majority,
Chief Justice Hughes gave legal recognition to the place which
the worker and his union already occupied in economic reality,
and had no difficulty holding that:
The statute goes no further than to safeguard the
right of employees to self-organization and to select
representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or
coercion by their employer.
That is a fundamental right. Employees have as
clear a right to organize and select their representatives
for lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize
its business and select its own officers and agents. Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise of
the right of employees to self-organization and representation is a proper subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority9 .
Thus ended the long struggle for survival. Firmly secured by
the provisions of the Wagner Act compelling the employer to
bargain with the union chosen by the employees' and further
strengthened by the union shop, closed shop, and maintenanceof-membership" clauses in the collective bargaining agreements, the unions began to assume the dominant role.
For twelve years the unions strengthened their hold on
labor-management relations until the inevitable reaction occurred in 1947 with the passage of the Labor-Management Relations Act 2 commonly known as the Taft-Hartley Act. The
Taft-Hartley Act partially restored the balance of power between labor and management by providing that unions, as well
9 Id. at 33.
10 49 Stat. 452 (1947).
1 Maintenance-of-membership provisions do not necessarily mean that all em-

ployees must be union members but they do require employees who are
members to maintain their membership in good standing.
12 61 Stat. 136 (1947).

as employers, could be charged with unfair labor practices 3 .
Further, the Taft-Hartley Act made the dosed shop unlawful' 4 ,
permitting however, the union shop where it was not prohibited
by state law. Thus the states could enact anti-union shop legislation or right-to-work laws and a man could work without
ever being compelled to join a union. Such a provision, argued
the unions, would be a death-blow to organized labor. The proponents of the measure, however, feel that the right to choose
whether or not to join a union is a fundamental freedom which
every worker in a democratic society should enjoy.
Section 14(B) of the Taft-Hartley Act which provides the
legal sanction for the right-to-work law is still the subject of
wide controversy. The following discussion is offered as an
attempt to examine the issues underlying this controversy from
a practical and legal standpoint.
SURVEY OF THE STATES ENACTING
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
The right-to-work law permits the employee to exercise a
right to either join or refrain from joining a union' 5 . It pro'8 61 Stat. 140 (1947).
14 Cases declaring the closed shop agreements illegal and making the contract
per se illegal are: Charles E. Hires Co., 85 NT R.B. 1208 (1949); Jandel
Furs, 100 N.L.R.B. 1390 (1952); Monolith Portland Cement Co., 94
N.L.R.B. 1358 (1951); and Port Chester Electrical Constr. Co., 97
N.LYRB. 354 (1951). Union security provisions containing the traditional closed-shop requirement were struck down in the following cases:
McCloskey & Co., 116 N.LR.B. (No. 142) (1956); Plumbers' Pipefitters, Local 231, 115 NLRB. 594 (1956); Daugherty Co., 112
N.-LR.B. 986 (1955); Goren, d.b.a. City Window Cleaning Co., 114
N.L.R.B. 906 (1955); C. A. Batson Co., 108 NT.R.B. 1337 (1954);
Hager & Sons Hinge Mfg. Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 163 (1948); Win. W.
Kimmins & Sons, 92 NT.R.B. 98 (1950).
15A typical statute, such as that found in Va. Code, § 40-68 through § 40-74
(1950), is as follows: 1 § 40-68. Policy of article-It is hereby declared to be the public policy of Virginia that the right of persons to
work shall not be denied or abridged on account of membership or
nonmembership in any labor unior or labor organization. f § 40-69.
Agreements or combinations declared unlawful.-Any agreement or
combination between any employer and any labor union or labor organization whereby persons not members of such union or organization
shall be denied the right to work for the employer, or wherever such

vides a freedom of choice not present where the union shop
is allowed.
A survey of the laws of the various states indicates that
twenty states have enacted right-to-work laws. The enactment
of such laws began in 1944 when Florida and Arkansas
amended their Constitutions. This was emulated by Nebraska
in 1947, and Arizona in 1948.
As distinguished from constitutional amendments the State
of South Dakota enacted a right-to-work law in 1945 and this
method was followed in 1947 by Georgia, Iowa, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia.
Following the adoption of the Taft-Hartley Act and the
sanctions expressed in section 14 (b) by Congress the following
states enacted right-to-work laws: North Dakota in 1948;
Nevada in 1952; Alabama in 1953; Mississippi, South Carolina, and Louisiana in 1954 (the latter State repealed its law
membership is made a condition of employment or continuation of employment by such employer, or whereby any such union or organization
acquires an employment monopoly in any enterprise, is hereby declared
to be against public policy and an illegal combination or conspiracy.
ff § 40-70. Employers not to require employees to become or remain
members of union.-No person shall be required by an employer to
become or remain a member of any labor union or labor organization
as a condition of employment or continuation of employment by such
employer. 11§ 40-71. Employers not to require abstention from membership in union.-No person shall be required by an employer to abstain or refrain from membership in any labor union or labor organization as a condition of employment or continuation of employment.
ff § 40-72. Employer not to require payment of union dues, etc.-No
employer shall require any person, as a condition of employment or continuation of employment, to pay any dues, fees or other charges of any
kind to any labor union or labor organization. ff § 40-73. Recovery
by individual unlawfully denied employment.-Any person who may
be denied employment or be deprived of continuation of his employment in violation of §§ 40-70, 40-71 or 40-72 or of one or more of
such sections, shall be entitled to recover from such employer and from
any other person, firm, corporation or association acting in concert with
him by appropriate action in the courts of this Commonwealth such
damages as he may have sustained by reason of such denial or deprivation
of employment. ff § 40-74. Application of article to contracts.-The provisions of this article shall not apply to any lawful contract in force on
April thirtieth, nineteen hundred and forty-seven, but they shall apply
in all respects to contracts entered into thereafter and to any renewal
or extension of an existing contract.

in 1956 and re-enacted it in the same year limiting it to agricultural workers); Utah in 1955; Indiana in 1957; and in 1958
Kansas became the twentieth State to enact such a law.
Mississippi 6 , North Carolina' 7 , South Carolina a', Utah1 9 ,
Virginia20 , and Alabama2 1 , all have virtually the same rightto-work law. All of these States make unlawful agreements
that require union membership as a condition of employment,
and in addition they: 1) outlaw payment of "dues, fees, or
other charges of any kind" to a labor union as a condition of
employment; 2) make "any agreement or combination between
any employer and any labor union" whereby union membership is a condition to employment "an illegal combination or
conspiracy"; and 3) allow recovery of damages by persons
deprived of employment by reason of non-membership in a
union or the non-payment of dues to a union.
Louisiana 2 has similar provisions, except that it applies
only to agricultural workers. Louisiana, Utah, and Virginia
have a further provision that prohibits picketing and other conduct "the purpose or effect of which is to cause, force, persuade
or induce any other person... to violate any provisions of this
Act.. ." Except as to this additional provision giving the State
power to prevent anyone from interfering with the purpose of
the law, the Arizona23 and Nevada2 4 statutes are similar to the
Virginia statute. Arizona and Nevada do not, however, have
an express provision prohibiting the payment of dues, fees and
other charges; and they declare illegal not only conspiracies
16 Miss. Code Ann. § 6984.5 (Supp. 1956).
17N.C. Code

§§ 95-78 to 95-84 (1949).

18 S.C. Code §§ 40-46 to 40-46.11 (1956).
19 Utah Code Ann. §§ 34-16-1 to 34-16-18 (Supp. 1955).
20

Va. Code Ann. §§ 40-68 to 40-74 (1950).

21

26 Ala. Code § 325 (1955).

22

La. Act. No. 397 at p. 776 (1956).

23Ariz. Rev.
24

Stat. Ann. §§ 23-1301 to 23-1307 (1956).

Nev. Rev. Stat. c. 613.230-300 (1955).

between employer and union but the union and its members
as well.
Arkansas2 5 , Georgia26 , Iowa2", and Tennessee"8 , agree on
prohibiting compulsory payment of union dues or other monetary consideration and denying compulsory union membership.
Nebraska29 , North Dakota"0 , South Dakota31 , and Texas 2
do not contain the extensive procedural provisions and limitations found in most States.
The latest States to pass right-to-work laws are Indiana33 ,
and Kansas "4 . The former is the most industrialized State to
pass such a law; the latter became the sixth State to enact the
law by constitutional amendment3 5 . The Kansas Constitutional
Amendment nullified existing union security clauses except
those negotiated under the Railway Labor Act.
It has been noted above that three States expressly provide
that picketing may be prohibited when it is done in regard to
the right-to-work law. The United States Supreme Court upheld
this anti-picketing provision in Virginia's right-to-work law in
Local Union No. 10 v. Graham3 6 . A Virginia trial court had
25 Ark. Star. Ann.

§§ 81-202 to 81-206 (1947).

2

6 Ga. Code Ann. §§ 54-901 to 54-908 (Supp. 1955).

2

7 Iowa Code Ann. §§ 736 A.1 to -.8 (1950).

28Tenn.

Code Ann. 33 50-208 to 50-212 (1955).

29Neb. Rev. Star. 3§ 48-217 to 48-219 (1952).
30 N.D. Rev. Code

§§ 34-0114 (Supp. 1949).

31 S.D. Code §§ 17.1101, 17.9914 (Supp. 1952).
32Tex. Rev. Civ. Star. Art. 5207(a)
33

(1947).

CCH Lab. L.Rep. Vol. 4, par. 41,025, Indiana (1959).

34Kan. Const. amend, art. 15, § 12 (1958).
3

5Kan. Const. amend. art. 15, § 12 (1958).

36

345 U.S. 192 (1953). Cf., Edwards v. Virginia, 191 Va. 272, 60 S.E.2d
916 (1950); Finney v. Hawkins, 189 Va. 878, 54 S.E.2d 872 (1949);
Electrical Workers v. Labor Board, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951); Building
Service Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Teamsters Union v.

enjoined peaceful picketing that was aimed at pressuring contractors to hire only union men. The Supreme Court state the
injunction did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment; and
furthermore, that section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act recognizes the validity of such State legislation.
A recent Kansas decision 37 has upheld a prohibition on
picketing based on that State's right-to-work law despite the
lack of a specific anti-picketing provision as is found in the
Virginia, Utah and Louisiana statutes. The case presented a
fact situation strikingly similar to the Graham38 case.
Non-union workmen were employed on a construction job
along with union workers. In an effort to organize the non-union
workers a construction union placed a solitary picket at the
job site with a placard which carried an invitation to join the
local union. The union workers refused to cross this "picket
line" and as a result the non-union workers were laid off since
the absence of the union laborers halted all work on the project.
Although the Kansas Supreme Court determined that this
picketing was solely for an organizational purpose its effect was
to deprive the non-union workers of their employment and was
therefore prohibited under the Kansas laws providing:
It shall be unlawful for any person.., to coerce
or intimidate any employee in the enjoyment of his
legal rights, including those guaranteed in . . . [the
right-to-work law] . .."
Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460
(1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Thomas
v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537-38 and 543-44 (concurring opinion) (1945);
Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776-777 (concurring
opinion) (1942); Carpenters Union v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722
(1942); Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 103-104 (1940); Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301
U.S. 468, 479-481 (1937). See also, Rose, Labor Management Relations
Act & the States' Power to Grant Relief, 39 Va.L.Rev. 765 (1953).
37 Binder v. Construction & General Laborers Local Union, 181 Kan. 799, 317
P.2d 371 (1957).
38 Local Union No. 10 v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953).
3

9 Kan. G.S. 1955 Supp. 44-809.

Thus the picketing was enjoined without the benefit of any
specific anti-picketing provision.
A third case, InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters, A.F.L.
v. Vogt, Inc."° enjoined picketing which attempted to coerce
and intimidate an employer into pressuring his employees to
join the union. This case is an interesting comparison with
the Graham41 and Kansas4 2 decisions since it arose in Wisconsin
which does not have a right-to-work law. Nevertheless, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court found that the picketing violated
the public policy of the State as established in the Wisconsin
Employment Peace Act and was therefore subject to a restraining injunction.
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the injunction
of the Wisconsin Court in an important decision formulating the
current policy for state regulation in this area43 . In an opinion
which extensively reviews the cases which have developed the
law on this subject, the Court seems to be bearing away from
the broad protection which it formerly gave picketing under
the First Amendment, toward a policy which will give the
states a much wider discretion to make their own determination
of when picketing is a violation of state law.
Thus picketing has been successfully enjoined under an
anti-picketing provision of a state right-to-work law, under
a state right-to-work law not having an anti-picketing provision, and as merely violative of state public policy.
Unfortunately, something of a cloud still remains on the
status of the law in this area due to a Supreme Court decision 44
just 21 days prior to the Vogt45 case, in which the Court
40 270 Wis. 315, 74 N.W.2d 749 (1956).
41 Supra, note 38.
42

Supra, note 37.

43

International Brotherhood of Teamsters, A.F.L. v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S.
284 (1957).

44

Board of Elec. Workers v. Farnsworth & Chambers Co., 353 U.S. 969 (1957)

45 Supra, note 43.

granted certiorari only to say that it reversed a Tennessee
Supreme Court decision affirming an injunction against picketing found violative of that state's right-to-work law. Without
a more complete explanation the significance of this case can
only be the subject of speculation. One commentary4 6 has suggested that the picketing activity enjoined by the Tennessee
Court was either prohibited or protected by the Taft-Hartley
Act and thus the doctrine of federal preemption deprived the
state of jurisdiction. Another possibility is that Vogt is limited
in application to purely intrastate situations, however, the lack
of any mention in the decision of a commerce factor seems to
preclude this interpretation.
The thoroughness of the Vogt" opinion and the fact that
it is the later decision, although only by a few days, would
seem to place it in a secured position as being the best indication of the Supreme Court's stand in this area.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS
The basic constitutionality of the right-to-work laws was
established in two leading cases decided in 1948. In the first
decision 4 8, which consolidated two cases concerning the rightto-work laws of Nebraska and North Carolina, the statutes
were challenged as violating free speech, impairing the obligation of contracts, depriving unions and members of equal protection of the laws, and constituting a deprivation of due process.
The Supreme Court gave varying degrees of consideration to
each of these contentions and upheld the validity of the rightto-work provision in both states. As to the question of free
speech the court said: "Nothing in the language of the laws
indicates a purpose to prohibit speech, assembly, or petition"."
46

See, Mamet, Free Speech and Right to Work, 52 Nw.U.L.Rev. 143 at 168,
171 (1958).

47 Supra, note
48

45.
Lincoln Federal Union et. al. v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co. et. al.,
335 U.S. 525 (1949).

49 Id. at 530.

The Court dismissed the question of impairing the obligation of
contracts by saying: "That contention is without merit and is
now too clearly established to require discussion"°." Rejecting
the argument that right-to-work laws destroy equal protection
of the laws, the court said:
Because the outlawed contracts are a useful incentive
to the growth of union membership, it is said that these
laws weaken the bargaining power of the unions and
correspondingly strengthen the power of employers.
This may be true, but there are other matters to be
considered. The state laws also make it impossible for
an employer to make contracts with company unions
which obligate the employer to refuse jobs to union
members. In this respect, these state laws protect the
employment opportunities of members of independent
unions" .
On the following day the Surpeme Court rendered its
second decision upholding Arizona's right-to-work law52 . The
Court felt that the difference in wording of the Arizona provision compared with the Nebraska and North Carolina provisions justified a separate opinion. The language of the
Arizona provision prohibited employment discrimination against
non-union workers but did not provide the same protection for
union workers. It was argued that such a provision discriminated against union members and denied them equal protection
of the laws.
The Court's answer to this argument was that there were
other Arizona laws which afforded protection to union members,
pointing specifically to a statute making it a misdemeanor to
coerce an employee to sign a non-union agreement. It is not
necessary that the same provision protecting non-union workers
also protect union members. The most effective statutory
scheme for striking at labor discrimination is a matter for
50 Id. at 531.
51 Id. at 532.

52A.Fl. v. American Sash and Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949).

legislative judgment which had in fact been exercised in Arizona
and there was no denial of equal protection of the laws.
THE RIGHT-TO-WORK LAW UNDER THE RAILWAY
LABOR ACT: THE HANSON CASE
Congress amended the Railway Labor Act in 195 1" to provide that union-shop provisions in collective bargaining agreements between railroads and their employees would be upheld
irrespective of state law. Thus, state right-to-work laws were
no longer of any consequence to the railroad industry.
This amendment was challenged in the leading case of
Railway Employees' Department, A.F.L. v. Hanson54 , on the
grounds that it violated the First and Fifth Amendments by depriving employees of their freedom of association and forcing
them to pay for many things besides the cost of collective bargaining. The Court rejected these contentions in an opinion
which stressed the power of Congress, under the commerce
clause, to enact such legislation. However, the Court was extremely cautious to limit the scope of their decision in regard to
the First Amendment and it carefully noted that:
Congress endeavored to safeguard against... [the]
possibility... [of compulsory membership impairing freedom of expression] . . . by making explicit
that no condition to membership may be imposed except
as respects 'periodic' dues, initiation fees, and assessments5 5 .
...

The Court further stated expressly that its ruling on the
First Amendment was not to prejudice any case beyond the
narrow bounds of Hanson.
This qualification indicated that if conditions in the collective
bargaining agreement were only a front for the enforcement of
53

64 Star. 1238 (1951).

54 351 U.S.225 (1956).
55 Id.

at 238.

ideological conformity, then the protection afforded by the
First Amendment would compel a different result. Acting on
this interpretation of Hanson, the Georgia Supreme Court has
recently held that an allegation that dues and other payments
required of union members would be used to support ideological
and political doctrines and candidates which plaintiffs were unwilling to support and in which they did not believe was sufficient basis for an injunction against the enforcement of a union
shop agreement". In view of the notorious political expenditures made by labor unions the theory of this case, if followed,
could have an enormous effect on the enforceability of union
shop clauses-not only under the Railway Labor Act-but also
in states which do not have right-to-work laws.
THE PRO AND CON OF RIGHT-TO-WORK LAWS:
A PROPOSAL
At one time the courts held it was constitutional for an
employer to make an employee sign a non-union contract,
commonly known as a "yellow-dog contract 57 ." Now the majority of courts, except for those found in the right-to-work
states, say the union may compel the employee to join the
union or lose his job58 ; and the unions, of course, frequently
have a union shop provision incorporated into their collective
bargaining agreements. Between these extremes there ought
to be a middle ground. Do not the right-to-work laws provide
the solution?
On behalf of the unions, it is contended that the strength
of a union, like any organization, depends on the number of
its members and therefore the union shop is necessary as a
means of providing union security. But this argument fails
in light of the common knowledge that unions are no
longer in their infancy. The need for union security through
sheer numerical force is not as great today as it was when
56 Looper v. Georgia Southern & Florida Ry. Co., 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101
(1957).
57

Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).

58 See, Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17 (1954).

the injunction was used to suppress union growth before the
enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia and Taft-Hartley Acts.
Furthermore, this argument presupposes that members will
desert the union in vast numbers upon the enactment of a
right-to-work law. Such a disaster seems hardly likely to befall those unions who are truly providing their members with
the proper benefits of union membership.
A far more serious contention made by unions in opposition to the right-to-work law is that those who are allowed to
remain outside the union and yet work alongside union members are "free riders". A "free rider" is one who receives the
benefits of union representation but does not contribute his
fair share to the support of the union by becoming a member.
The United States Supreme Court upheld the union's concept of the "free rider" in a 1954 decision which said:
.. . legislative history [of the Taft-Hartley Act]
clearly indicates that Congress intended to prevent
utilization of union security agreements for any purpose other than to compel payment of union dues and
fees. Thus, Congress recognized the validity of unions'
concern about "free riders," . . . Thus an employer can
discharge an employee for non-membership in a union
security contract valid under the Act with such union,
and if the other requirements of the proviso are met" .
But was it within Congressional intent, as endorsed by the
Court, that union dues and fees would be used for anything
more than the costs of collective bargaining? Unions are engaged in the insurance business, maintain welfare funds"0 , and
are highly active in political affairs 6" which hardly seem connected with collective bargaining.
59 Id. at 41.

60 Hearings Before Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R.
7789, 81st Cong. 2d Sess., 42 (1950).
61 See, Editorial Board's Comments, Regulation of Labor's Political Contributions & Expenditures: The British and American Experience, 19 U.Chi.L.Rev. 371

(1951); and Ruark, Labor's Political Spending and Free

Speech, 53 Nw. U.Lev. 61 (1958).

The realization that payment of dues covers more than
the costs of collective bargaining seems to put the "free rider"
argument in a different light. The Georgia Supreme Court,
in the case previously discussed, has provided one example of
judicial response to this situation in refusing to enforce compulsory unionism where it was alleged that payments would be
used to support certain ideological and political views6".
The contrary position was presented by the California Supreme Court in De Mille v. American Federation of Radio
Artists6 3 in which the petitioner faced expulsion from the union
because he refused to pay a one dollar assessment which was
to help finance opposition to a proposed right-to-work law.
Although the petitioner favored the proposed law the Court
held that his First Amendment rights were not violated since
his individual interest in union funds was terminated upon
payment to the union. Furthermore the Court felt that the
use of the union funds for political purposes is only to be
interpreted as an expression of the majority of the members
and is not at all indicative of the personal opinion of any one
individual member.
This reasoning, however, begs the question of whether the
payment could be properly required in the first place. Because
one side is put in power by a majority vote should not mean
that the minority is compelled to join that side and help
finance its campaign for further power. The freedom of
choice is a fundamental and underlying concept of a democratic society. Compulsory support of a particular ideology
would mean the end of that freedom. Rule by the majority
should mean the preservation of minority rights and minority
opposition.
It is interesting to consider the restrictive barriers of the
union shop in the light of a reference to the United Nations
Charter by Mr. Justice Black in his concurring opinion in
Oyama v. California"4 :
62

Supra, note 56.

63

31 Cal.2d 139, 187 P.2d 769 (1947).

64 332 U.S. 633 (1948).

.. . [the alien] law stands as an obstacle to the

free accomplishment of our policy in the international
field. One of these reasons is that we have recently
pledged ourselves to cooperate with the United Nations
to 'promote ... universal respect for, and observance
of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all
... ' How can this nation be faithful to this international
pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and
occupancy by aliens on account of race are permitted
to be enforced .

6.5

A similar point could be made opposing the union shop
since the United Nations, in its Universal Declaration of Human
Rights recognizes the right of everyone to work. It expressly
states:
1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and association.
2) No one may be compelled to belong to an association.
3) Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of
employment, to just and favorable conditions of work
and to protection against unemployment" .
While international events, since this mention by the Supreme Court of our obligations under the United Nations
Charter, have focused attention on the maintenance of separate
national concepts rather than the blending of philosophies
among nations, this conflict serves to point up a more realistic
and practical inconsistency within the Taft-Hartley Act itself.
Under the Act it is provided that an employee cannot be
restrained or coerced into joining a union6 7. Yet the Act
allows the union shop, which in itself is coercion in its most
compelling form. Thus the Act, in effect, says that no one
65 Id. at 649.

66 Ded. of Human Rights, Art. 22, Act 22, § 1, United Nations.
67 61 Stat. 140 (1957).

shall be coerced into joining a union, however if he is going
to work in over half the States he must become a member because the union shop is lawful. The result of this is a rule
with a built-in exception which is broader than the rule itself.
Another problem arising from the Taft-Hartley Act and
bearing on the question of whether or not the individual
worker should be free to choose to join a union concerns the
election at which employees choose a union to represent them.
The Act only requires a majority of the employees to decide
on the union which is to be their bargaining agent6 8 .
The Act further provides that no election need be held
in order for the union to enter into a union shop agreement
unless thirty percent voice an objection to such an agreement" .
Admittedly there are those who desire the union to represent them but do not agree with the union shop concept.
Moreover, they do not desire to be compelled to remain in a
union as requisite to their continuing to hold their jobs. To
consider an extreme example, assume that there are one
hundred employees working for a company and of this one
hundred, fifty-one desire that a particular union represent them.
Out of this fifty-one there are fifteen who do not want a union
shop, but are in favor of a union so long as it is a voluntary
union. An election is held under the provisions of the National
Labor Relations Act in accordance with the law and the union
is voted upon and elected to represent the employees. The
forty-nine employees opposing the union find a job elsewhere.
Of the fifty-one left the fifteen opposed to a union shop voice
their objection only to find that they do not satisfy the thirty
percent requirement. Is this not a result of thirty-six out
of one hundred employees deciding to have a union shop
provision? Further, would it not be arguable that the
union would not have been sanctioned by the majority of
the employees had the union shop question been considered
when the union itself was considered? If the union-shop is
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going to continue as a part of the law, why cannot the vote
on the union and union-shop be considered simultaneously in
order to give all employees an opportunity to express their
opinion on compulsory unionism from the outset? As noted
previously the Taft-Hartley Act requires only a majority of
the employees to decide whether or not they will become
unionized. What is the magic to the concept of the majority
when by definition it need be only one more than half?
Also, as noted above, the Taft-Hartley Act requires no
election to incorporate a union-shop agreement into a collective
bargaining contract; except when thirty percent of the workers
object and then a secret ballot is required. In contrast the
State of Wisconsin requires that two-thirds of the membership agree before a union-shop provision becomes a part of
their collective bargaining agreement' ° and Hawaii 7' and
Colorado72 require a three-fourths majority vote for such a
provision. Query: should there not be some majority vote required prior to entering into such an agreement if the agreement is not to be considered initially when the union itself
is considered?
Over fifty years ago Chief Justice Hughes said in regard
to the right-to-work:
It requires no argument to show that the right to
work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose of the
[Fourteenth] Amendment to secure7 3 .
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In 1956 Justice Douglas dissented in a case which upheld
the right of the State of New York to suspend from the practice
of medicine a doctor who had been convicted of contempt of
Congress. He said:
The right to work, I had assumed, was the most
precious liberty that a man possesses. Man has indeed
as much right to work as he has to live, to be free, to
own property74 .
These two quotes are expressive of the sentiments of those
who would place the right to work in a predominant position
over union security which is maintained by the union shop.
This view values the individual freedom of association more
highly than the purported necessity of the union shop to support labor unions.
Nevertheless the Supreme Court passed favorably on the
validity of the union shop in the Hanson75 case, and thus
gave legal sanction to the denial of the right to work to one
who is not a member of a labor union. In theory it is hard
to reconcile this result with the following choice of decisions
of the Court holding that one could not lawfully be denied
work because of his status as a Catholic priest7 6 , a Chinese
immigrant", a teacher of German7 8 , a freight train conductor79 , a State employee80 , a Negro8 1 , or a teacher in a municipally supported school8 .
The real reconciliation of the Hanson decision is that the
labor union has now become one of the country's accepted
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institutions. Its function in our modern society has become
such that it can successfully compete against long standing
concepts of individual freedoms, both in legislative halls and
judicial chambers.
The real dilemma in the controversy over union security
and right-to-work legislation does not lie in forcing a choice
of one which will inevitably lead to the destruction of the
other. The greatest problem is how to get labor to adopt a
philosophy which gives proper recognition to its new role as
a fully matured member of the industrial community, rather
than the purely defensive strategy which was more in keeping
with its struggle for survival in the thirties. The only real
union argument against the right-to-work movement which
has any validity concerns the problem of the "free rider".
How then can the basic freedom of association be preserved in each individual worker and yet insure that he bears
his fair share of the cost of collective bargaining?
Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act there had been some attempts
made to reach a compromise solution of the problem by adopting a "support money" plan and "work permit system." Under
these arrangements all workers for whom the union acted as
a bargaining agent were required to make payments to support
the union's bargaining efforts, whether members or not. The
National Labor Relations Board has upheld the validity of
these plans8", but their effectiveness has been impaired by
Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act which prohibits employers
from making any collections from workers under the check off
system except union dues.
Another device which has been used to solve the problem
of compulsory unionism is the agency shop. This plan exacts
union dues from all workers on the theory that collective
bargaining is equally beneficial to the entire work force, but
does not compel union membership. The operation of this
arrangement is open to the same objections as the union shop
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since there is nothing to insure that the non-union worker is
paying solely for collective bargaining.
Furthermore, the union shop is lawful and there is a
strong argument that union membership can be required in
any event. The leading case involving the question of whether
union membership is an absolute necessity under a union
shop contract is Union Starch and Refining Company 4 . The
case is open to wide interpretation, but apparently the N.L.R.B.
decided that the only condition of membership which a worker
is required to meet is the tender of dues and if the union
"imposes any other qualifications and conditions for membership with which he is unwilling to comply, such an employee
may not be entitled to membership, but he is entitled to keep
his job." Because there have been contrary analyses made of
this decision it must be said that the question is still unsettled85 .
But, whatever the present law on compulsory membership, it is evident that a statutory framework is not in existence
for insuring that payments by a protesting minority will only
go for the proper union purpose of collective bargaining.
Since there appears to be no presently effective method
of protecting the interests of the union through control of
the "free rider" and at the same time permitting the individual
worker to retain his inherent freedom of association, the proposal is offered that serious consideration be given the Swiss
system of union security as a possible compromise between
these presently opposing views in the United States8 6. The
Swiss system is based on requirements in collective agreements
that non-union workers make "contributions of solidarity"
which are essentially payments for the worker's share of the
costs of collective bargaining. The Swiss Supreme Court has
upheld the enforcement of these "contributions" provided that
84 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced 186 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1951) cert.
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they are less than the dues paid by union members". This
holding coupled with prior Swiss judicial doctrine opposing
compulsory unionism has resulted in a system which apparently
has met the main objections from both the advocates and
opponents of the union shop8".
While the Swiss system has primarily developed as judicial
doctrine, the inauguration of a similar type program in the
United States at this stage of development in our labor law
would undoubtedly require legislative enactment. Compulsory
unionism would have to be abolished on a nation-wide basis
while at the same time establishing requirements which would
force a strict accounting upon the unions for their outlays as
bargaining agents to insure that such expenditures go solely
for the purpose of collective bargaining. The bookkeeping
complexities involved in allocating certain mixed expenditures
between collective bargaining and other union activities could
presumably be worked out according to regulations prescribed
by the National Labor Relations Board and based on accepted
cost accounting procedures. The administration of our tax
laws through a combination of law and regulations is a strong
precedent for the success of such a program.
The political implications involved in adopting the proposed change based on the Swiss system are obviously enormous.
It is not the purpose here to go into the almost unending
debate which is provoked by such a proposal beyond a brief
mention of its possibly beneficial aspects.
It is essential that the advancing form of our modern industrial society not be allowed to over-run the individual freedoms which are the foundation of our form of government.
The freedom of association is fundamental and basic and the
individual worker should be allowed to exercise his own judgment in electing whether to join or remain outside of the
organized union. But to the extent that he receives direct
benefits from the union he should expect to return adequate
87 Id. at 169.
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compensation based on the principle of restitution which has
long been established in our legal system. In so far as these
two aspects of the problem are concerned the Swiss system
seems to be an effective safeguard for protecting both the interests of the union and the individual worker.
However it is not enough to dispose of the "free rider"
argument since the unions are firmly convinced that compulsory
membership is one of the most effective weapons in their
arsenal of union security. Nevertheless it is submitted that
abolishment of compulsory unionism will in the long run
prove highly beneficial to organized labor8".
Unions today still imagine themselves as they were a
quarter century ago when management had the upper hand and
unionism was something of a crusade for the underdog. Yet
unions today are organizations of enormous power. It is undoubtedly true that much of this power has resulted from
the mass membership flowing from the union shop. Yet this
source of power has proved to be double-edged and has had
its own detrimental effect. Now the very size of unions has
forced an almost ponderous approach to the problems of the
worker on the assembly line. The union is no longer the
readily available brotherhood which offered the personal appeal
that attracted the downtrodden worker in former days.
Today the average union worker counts his union dues as
merely one of his necessary recurring expenses such as an insurance premium or the water bill. Many have little knowledge
of the tremendous improvements brought about on behalf of
the working man through the evolution of unionism. This
situation is the direct result of compulsory membership which
has placed power in the hands of a few without compelling
any return of responsibility by those few to the many who are
the source of the power.
The further consequences of unrestricted power are currently being illustrated by the disclosure of corrupt and illegal
practices on the part of organized labor. While these dis89 Cf. Niebank, In Defense of Right-to-Work Laws, 8 Lab.Lj. 459 (1957).

closures relate to only a small segment of the unions it need
hardly be pointed out that the resulting public indignation has
magnified these revelations to cover the entire organized labor
movement.
Without the crutch of compulsory membership the unions
would be forced to return to their old campaigns to sell themselves to the workers. Orientation programs would be necessary
to acquaint members with the inner workings of their union
and the benefits of union membership. Such a change would
promote a type of union renaissance which would restore the
true purpose of unions and consolidate their gains for further
advances.
While some loss would inevitably occur in numerical membership it would be more than made up for by the awakened
interest which could be expected from those members who are
presently inactive participants. Far from fearing complete
annihilation the unions should realize that the American working man is too economically astute to stand by and watch the
unions die from lack of support.

